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#METOO, DUE PROCESS, AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION: THE PERFECT STORM 






In December of 2017, a bipartisan group of senators including Democrat Kirsten Gillibrand 
and Republican Lindsey Graham introduced the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment 
Act (“the Act”). The Act would amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to make arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts regarding Title VII claims unenforceable.1 On the same day, 
another bipartisan group introduced a version of the bill in the House of Representatives which, if 
enacted, would function in the same manner as the Senate bill.2 Lawmakers introduced the Act in 
response to the MeToo movement and public outcry over the sexual harassment scandals involving 
Harvey Weinstein and other prominent figures in Hollywood, government, and business.3 The Act 
enjoys bipartisan support in Congress and the support of the Attorneys General of all fifty states, 
the US territories, and the District of Columbia as a result of the prominent position sexual 
harassment currently occupies in the public discourse.4 
However, it is unlikely that major reform of the FAA will occur in any manner other than 
through legislation due to the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding adhesive arbitration 
agreements in the consumer and employment contexts, and its generally favorable view of 
arbitration.5 Passing the Act and other similar legislation is seen by groups like the National 
Association of Attorneys General as a key way to ensure that victims of sexual harassment receive 
the due process and access to justice that can be denied to claimants by mandatory arbitration.6 
 
*Kaci Dupree is a J.D. candidate at Penn State Law, class of 2020, and Managing Editor of the Penn State 
Arbitration Law Review.   
 
1  Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017).  
2  Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, H.R. 4570, 115th Cong. (2017). 
3  See Susan Sholinsky, #MeToo’s Impact on Sexual Harassment Law Just Beginning, Law360, (July 11, 2018) 
(actress Alyssa Milano’s tweet asking any woman who had been sexually harassed to respond in a tweet and share 
her story launched the MeToo movement, prompting lawmakers nationwide to propose legislation, including the 
Act, designed to protect victims in a variety of contexts including the workplace). 
 
4  Sarah Gruber and Salvatore G. Gangemi, Attorneys General Support Ending Arbitration of Workplace Sexual 




5  Thomas E. Carbonneau, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 4th ed., 69 (“… they [lower courts] contested the 
legality and desirability of adhesive arbitration. The Court appeared to be convinced that, if any exceptions to 
arbitrability were to be made, arbitration would cease to resolve effectively the problems of civil litigation.”)  
 
6 Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House, Mitch McConnell, 
Senate Majority Leader, Charles Schumer, Senate Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader (February 
12, 2018)  (“victims of such serious misconduct should not be constrained to pursue relief from decision makers 
who are not trained as judges, are not qualified to act as courts of law, and are not positioned to ensure that such 
victims are accorded both procedural and substantive due process.”) 
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Unfortunately, like other congressional attempts to reform the arbitration system such as the 
Arbitration Fairness Act,7the Act is unlikely to advance out of committee in either house because 
Congress is generally unwilling to interfere with the Court’s expansive arbitration regime.8  
As the passage of federal legislation amending the FAA is unlikely, state legislators should 
pass legislation that would protect employees that bring sexual harassment claims and would 
provide the due process that every state attorney general has advocated for.9 Although the Supreme 
Court has established that the FAA preempts contradictory state law,10states can and should enact 
legislation. States could provide a functional framework at the state level to take advantage of the 
perfect storm that encourages policies that protect sexual harassment victims that has developed 
as the result of the ongoing MeToo movement without taking away the ability to arbitrate if both 
of the parties so choose.   
 
II. ADHESIVE ARBITRATION: THE GREAT DEBATE  
A.  The Development of the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence    
Prior to the FAA’s passage, courts in the United States expressed disdain towards the 
practice of arbitration.11 Courts were also far less likely than modern courts to uphold an agreement 
to arbitrate because judges at the time viewed arbitrators as unqualified decision-makers.12 A 
dismissive attitude towards arbitration as an inadequate forum for redress of claims was fairly 
typical of the judiciary at the time and was a large part of the impetus for the passage of the FAA.13  
However, Congress did not vote for the FAA in 1924 solely to correct the judicial bias against 
arbitration; legislators also sought to create a procedural framework that would enable primarily 
commercial parties to expediently resolve disputes between themselves without having to resort 
 
 
7  See Carbonneau, supra note 5, 72-73 (describing the Fairness in Arbitration Act as one of many failed 
Congressional attempts to decrease the reach of the Court’s arbitrability jurisprudence and reform the arbitration 
system).  
 
8  Id., at 72 (“There appears to be a tacit understanding between the Court and the U.S. Congress that arbitration falls 
within the Court’s exclusive bailiwick.”) 
 
9  Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 6.  
 
10  See generally Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).  
 
11 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 51 (West, 7th ed., 
2012), (“Arbitration, in their [the courts’] view, was makeshift justice. Courts were reluctant to compel parties to 
arbitrate.”) 
 
12 See Carbonneau, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 51,  (quoting Justice Story: “when 
courts are asked to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators whose award shall be final, they necessarily pause to 
consider whether such tribunals possess adequate means of giving redress… and to close against him the doors of 
justice…”).  
 
13  Id., at 61 (“According to the Court, [in Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)] the FAA was 





to costly and time-consuming litigation.14 In reality, the FAA was special interest litigation brought 
to Congress by sophisticated commercial parties and was intended to make it easier for merchants 
and other commercial parties to arbitrate their disputes with minimal judicial interference.15 The 
FAA provides a procedural mechanism for selecting arbitrators, judicial enforcement of awards, 
and gives arbitrators the power to compel witnesses to testify.16  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has expanded its jurisprudence since the inception of the 
FAA to protect a right to arbitrate in a diverse score of situations. A key factor in the development 
of arbitration jurisprudence was the establishment of the separability doctrine in the 1960s.17 The 
Court ordered the district courts to uphold arbitration agreements, so long as the arbitration clause 
was valid, even when the remainder of the contract would be invalid.18 Subsequently, the Court 
further expanded the applicability of the FAA by striking down a California law that exempted 
franchise disputes from arbitration and held that Congress created a substantive body of law when 
it enacted the FAA and intended to prevent state legislators from passing legislation designed to 
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.19 In 1983, the court further solidified its 
position by holding that “…as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”20 By the end of the 1980s, the Court’s 
position with respect to arbitration had become fairly clear: there was a strong, emphatic, liberal 
federal policy in favor of arbitration.21  
 
 
14   Willy E. Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain for Unsophisticated Consumers’ and Employees’ Contractual 
Rights? - Legal and Empirical Analyses of Courts’ Mandatory Arbitration Rulings and the Systematic Erosion of 
Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Defenses Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 25 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 
143, 165 (2016) (“the congressional record clearly reveals that Congress enacted the FAA for other reasons: (1) to 
allow sophisticated merchants to fashion voluntary arbitration agreements; (2) to encourage courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements; (3) to increase merchants’ ability to resolve trade disputes efficiently by eliminating 
expensive litigation; and (4) to “preserve business friendships” within and between various trade associations.”) 
 
15  Carbonneau, supra note 12 (stating that the FAA was originally drafted by the American Bar Association’s 
Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law to encourage the enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
commercial contexts).  
 
16  9 U.S.C. §5, §7, §10.  
 
17 See Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding that the arbitration clause is 
“seperable” from the main contract. Therefore, even where the main contract could be challenged, the arbitration 
clause could still be valid).  
 
18 Id. at 403 (“The federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue.”) 
 
19  See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1980) (“Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts 
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”) 
 
20  460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 
21 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1980) (“in enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a 
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the 





B. The States Fight Back: Resistance to Enforcing Arbitration Clauses  
 
After the Court solidified its stance in favor of arbitration, corporations began to take 
advantage of arbitration’s strong position by inserting pre-dispute arbitration agreements into their 
consumer contracts.22 The increasing addition of mandatory arbitration clauses in the consumer 
context gave rise to a conflict between state and lower federal courts and the Supreme Court as to 
their validity.23  Some courts regularly invalidated mandatory arbitration clauses on the grounds 
of unconscionability.24 Similarly, states courts differed with the Supreme Court over whether or 
not employees and consumers could be required to arbitrate statutory rights (such as civil rights).25 
The FAA contains the so-called “savings clause,” which appears to carve out an exception to 
arbitrability where at law or equity the contract would be considered invalid.26 Many courts have 
traditionally relied on the savings clause exemption in order to invalidate arbitration agreements 
on unconscionability grounds.27 However, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,28 the Court made it 
more difficult for states to invalidate arbitration agreements even when they were imposed 
unilaterally or could be invalidated on state law grounds.29 The Court held that state laws which 
allowed invalidation for unconscionability directly opposed the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.30 
The majority of opposition to enforcing arbitration agreements has come from California 
and the Ninth Circuit.31 In the view of these courts, agreements to arbitrate were considered 
 
22 See e.g. Green Tree Fin Corp. – Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (where an adhesive agreement to 
arbitrate between a consumer and a corporation was at issue).  
 
23 See Carbonneau, supra note 5 (“an ideological war developed between the U.S. Supreme Court and a number of 
lower federal and state courts in which the lower courts criticized the Court’s support for arbitration- in particular, 
they contested the legality and desirability of adhesive arbitration.”)  
 
24  See e.g. Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc. 609 F.3d 191, 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (which states that “arbitration 
provisions that confer an unfair advantage upon the party with greater bargaining power are substantively 
unconscionable.”) (quoting Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F. 3d 256 269 (3d 2003)). 
 
25 See e.g. Litle v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003) (discussing the validity of mandatory 
arbitration of federal and state statutory claims.) 
 
26  See 9 U.S.C. §2 (“An agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction or refusal shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”)  
 
27 For a discussion of the traditional unconscionability defense to arbitration agreements, see Tillman v. Commer. 
Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 
28 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
 
29 Id.  
 
30  See Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 151 (“although these agreements [at issue in AT&T] prevented consumers with 
modest ends from pursuing their right of recovery, the court held that state law policies about unconscionability 
were in direct opposition to the ‘strong emphatic public policy in favor of arbitration’.”) 
 
 
31 See e.g. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir 2002) and see e.g. Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)(superseded by statute)  (holding that the FAA did not preempt the 
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fundamentally unfair when they were imposed unilaterally, and arbitration itself represented a 
compromise of the courts’ fundamental role in American law as protectors of the public’s rights.32  
In terms of employment arbitration, the California Supreme Court has argued that in order to be 
valid, arbitration agreements which would mandate that employees arbitrate statutory claims are 
subject to requirements of minimum fairness.33  
The FAA also provides an exclusion in section one for certain classes of workers.34 Some 
courts based their rulings on the FAA’s employment exclusion in order to exclude workers’ 
contracts from mandatory arbitration clauses.35 However, the Supreme Court has held that this 
clause only implicates certain workers in interstate commerce, such as transportation workers, but 
does not exclude arbitration agreements in employment contracts for any other workers involved 
in interstate commerce, causing the employment exclusion’s significance to decrease over time.36 
As a result of this interpretation, very few workers’ contracts are actually excluded from the FAA, 
and pre-dispute agreements signed by employees are likely to be upheld.37 
 
California courts from refusing to enforce an arbitration clause that was unconscionable under California law, and 
that unconscionability had both procedural and substantive elements which could be implicated in class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements).  
 
32  Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 68 (“[the view in California is that] private parties should not be empowered to alter 
the creation and attribution of judicial jurisdiction and private arbitrators should not be substituted for judges in the 
performance of judicial tasks.”)  
 
33  See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 24 Cal. 4th 83 (Cal. 2000) ((quoting Cole v. Burns 
Intern. Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465,1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Such an arbitration agreement is lawful if it ‘(1) 
provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written  award, (4) 
provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees 
to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum. 
Thus, an employee who is made to use arbitration as a condition of employment 'effectively may vindicate [his or 
her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum’.”) 
 
34 See 9 U.S.C. §1 (“… but nothing herein shall apply to contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, or 
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”) 
 
35 See e.g. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that where the FAA did not apply to 
an employment contract, the court could not compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement.) 
 
36  Matthew Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under The United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical 
Clarification, 17 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 282, at 294 (“… the United States Supreme Court has more recently 
interpreted the word "involving" to be as broad as the word "affecting" commerce, i.e., as expressing the full reach 
of the Commerce power. Thus, the argument is that employees referred to as "engaged" in commerce had a well-
developed meaning limited to those who either transported goods or were so closely connected to such transport so 
as to be practically part of it.  Employees who "affected" commerce included not only transport workers "but also all 
workers involved in the manufacture or production of interstate goods." Consequently, the argument runs, when 
Congress chose to exempt only the former, it left the latter covered by the Act.”) 
 
37  Id. at 298. (explaining that “The U.S.A.A. exempts contracts of employment, all contracts of employment, over 
which Congress had constitutional authority. The scope of the commerce power when the U.S.A.A. was enacted was 
quite narrow; in the employment setting, it was limited largely to transportation workers. Thus in 1925, the U.S.A.A. 
could not have applied to an arbitration provision in the employment contract of a neo-natal physician, a 
manufacturing manager, or a secretary in a law firm, because these employees would not have been considered as 




C. “The law is clear”: The Supreme Court Reaffirms its Arbitration Jurisprudence 
 
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear in recent years that there are very few 
limitations regarding what types of contracts may include arbitration agreements despite the 
historical disagreement in the lower courts over the legitimacy of adhesive arbitration agreements. 
The Supreme Court has reinforced this view by making it nearly impossible to challenge this type 
of arbitration agreement in recent decisions.38 The Court has held that the FAA applies in state 
courts and that states must place arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contracts, greatly 
decreasing the options available to states to regulate the enforcement of arbitration clauses 
specifically.39 For example, in response to a California decision not to allow class action waivers 
in pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court held that allowing class arbitration would 
serve to impede arbitration proceedings, a result which would be in opposition to the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.40 The Court also held that arbitration agreements are enforceable against 
employees who wish to bring statutory claims against employers as long as the statute does not 
indicate that Congress intended to exclude arbitration as an adjudicatory mechanism for claims 
that arise under it.41 Even when a federal agency might bring a court case on behalf of an employee 
seeking to address civil rights claims, the court has upheld an adhesive agreement for that 
employee to arbitrate the same claims.42 Most recently, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,43 the 
Supreme Court upheld class action waivers in adhesive employment contracts because there is a 
clear Congressional directive to uphold arbitration agreements as written.44 The Epic Systems 
decision only reinforces the position that as a matter of federal law, arbitration agreements are 
likely to be enforced no matter the circumstances under which they were agreed to. 
In the wake of these decisions, it is clearer than ever that the Supreme Court is likely to 
uphold agreements to arbitrate even when, as in the Epic Systems decision, “the policy may be 
 
exemption has expanded along with it… the judicial policy toward arbitration has rendered the courts amenable to 
giving the Act a more sweeping application.”)  
 
38  Carbonneau, supra note 5 at 230.  
 
39  Allied- Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (“what states may not do is decide that a 
contract is fair enough in to enforce in all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its 
arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful….”)  
 
40 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 347-48 (2011) (explaining that the very nature of class 
arbitrations, which would involve numerous parties and formal procedures to protect them necessarily violates the 
policy favoring arbitration because it reduces the informal process to the equivalent of a civil trial.)   
 
41 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  
 
42  EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that the EEOC, as a third party, is not subject to the 
arbitration agreement and may bring a court case on the employee’s behalf but the arbitration agreement between the 
employer and employee is not invalidated).  
 
43 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (May 21, 2018).  
 
44 Id. at 1632  (“the policy may be debatable but the law is clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements 





debatable.”45 The Supreme Court’s reinforcement of arbitration as a preferred dispute resolution 
system has brought arbitration into favor as a mechanism by which companies may settle disputes 
with their employees. Ultimately, the debate between the courts as to whether adhesive arbitration 
agreements should be enforced is essentially settled by the Court’s strict enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. Further, any limitations on adhesive consumer or employment arbitration agreements 
in the near future must come in the form of legislative reform.  
 
III. ARBITRATION PROVIDES INSUFFICIENT DUE PROCESS TO VICTIMS OF WORKPLACE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT   
 
While arbitration is a valuable tool for the resolution of disputes in general because of its 
private nature and flexible procedures, these very aspects make arbitration an insufficient forum 
for the resolution of sexual harassment claims. While resolving these claims in court allows 
victims to come forward in the public eye or to file a class action, arbitration allows employers to 
prevent a class action suit and to receive a binding judgment that they do not have to disclose 
publicly. As a result, victims may never know that other victims exist, and the public may never 
know that a corporation’s employees have a history of making sexual harassment claims. 
Similarly, the flexibility of the arbitration procedure further allows large corporations to have an 
advantage over individual employees in preventing the disclosure of sexual harassment claims.  
 
A. The Antithesis of #MeToo: Silence and Arbitration of Workplace Sexual Harassment 
Claims 
 
The private nature of arbitral adjudication in comparison to the public’s access to court 
proceedings is one of the most significant problems identified by those who oppose arbitration’s 
use in the sexual harassment context.46 Since the inception of the United States and even when the 
states were colonies, the courts have played an important role in society.47 Public accountability is 
an important aspect of the courts’ role because when brought to court, the accused was at least 
theoretically brought before the whole community.48 Another important aspect of the judicial 
system is the ability of aggrieved employees to file class actions against their employers. In a 
sexual harassment case this can play a major role because an open court class action gives 
employees access to knowledge about the claims, which can encourage others to join the action, 
 
45 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. at 1632. 
 
46  See e.g.  letter from National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 9 (“additional concerns arise from the 
secrecy requirements of arbitration clauses, which disserve the public interest by keeping both harassment 
complaints and any settlements confidential.”) 
 
47 See Carbonneau, supra note 5 at 4 (“even if it is merely a perception, adjudication is indispensable to the integrity 
and efficacy of the social, economic, and political order.”) 
 
48  Judith Resnik, Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge and Economic Inequalities in Courts and Arbitrations, 96 
N.C.L rev. 605, (2018) (early colonial and state constitutions have always contained provisions stating that the 





and at the settlement stage, knowledge about the reasoning the court employed.49 The class-action 
feature of civil litigation is an example of a functional way in which the public is able to gain 
knowledge about and participate in litigation against sophisticated players like large 
corporations.50 The traditional openness of the courts in the United States functions as “sunshine” 
in litigations, shedding light on the proceedings by allowing the public to access them. When 
victims are able to air their claims publicly, others are able to learn of their claims, and this 
availability of knowledge to the public encourages those who have been harmed to bring their 
claims and keeps justice in the public eye.51  
By contrast, arbitration is private adjudication by its very definition52 because the parties 
to the contract in question set the terms. Parties get to choose the manner of adjudication, who will 
adjudicate the claims, and the degree of publicity when an award is rendered.53 Where the contract 
is adhesive, often the terms include anonymity.54 Victims are often barred from publicly discussing 
their claims because they are asked to sign non-disclosure agreements as part of the arbitration of 
sexual harassment claims.55 Further, even where the contract is adhesive, the court has held that it 
is constitutional for corporations to insert class action waivers into the employment agreement, 
denying claimants the ability to recover as a class.56 Similarly, arbitrators do not have to publish 
opinions and are not subject to the judgment of the community in the same way as the judiciary; 
even when awards are published, such as by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), the 
awards omit the name of the accuser and the accused in order to protect their identities.57Although 
this privacy ostensibly protects the claimant, it protects the accused and the employer as well. If 
no one ever knows that an employee has been accused of sexual harassment, then the corporation 
may not have to fire the accused employee (unless it is part of the arbitral award) and further, the 
 
49 Id., at 613- 615 (resorting to open courts can provide knowledge to the public about the case and about the 
reasoning for the result.  The increased knowledge decreases the disparity between sophisticated repeat players and 




51 Id. at 613, and 626-627 (discussing various state and federal court practices that give the public access to 
information about court proceedings and the public’s role in adjudication within the court system).  
 
52 See Carbonneau, supra note 5 at (“Arbitration is a private process that independently markets its services and pays 
its own overhead. There is no political entitlement to, and consequentially no rigorous social or legal regulation of, 
arbitration.”) 
 
53 See Carbonneau, supra note 12, Ch.1 §3 at 16-23.   
 
54 See Resnik, supra note 43, at 644 (describing the current case law as encouraging an attitude of secrecy and the 
common use of impositions of secrecy when agreements to arbitrate are entered into adhesively, such as one which 
was under review by the 9th circuit in 2012).  
 
55 Letter from National Association of Attorneys General supra note 6 (“this veil of secrecy may then prevent other 
persons similarly situated from learning of the harassment claims so that they, too, may pursue relief.”) 
 
56  See Epic Systems Corp. vs. Lewis, supra note 38. 
 
57 See e.g. 2007 AAA Lexis 37 (an arbitration award where, although published, identities of the corporation, 





corporation does not get a public reputation as a business that employees those who victimize 
others.58 Under the current process, it is possible for the accused employee to retain his position 
while the employee who brought a claim of sexual harassment to arbitration must remain silent. 
The privacy of the arbitral process is a valid tool for commercial disputes, but the value of the 
silence encouraged by this private system in the context of sexual harassment claims is certainly 
debatable in light of the plethora of victims who have come forward in response to the MeToo 
movement in the past year.59  
 
B. Arbitration’s utility as a flexible process can make it an unsuitable forum for the resolution 
of workplace sexual harassment claims 
 
Due process -both substantive and procedural- are cornerstones of the American judicial 
system. Due process in the court system has arisen out of a set of judicial and statutory rules that 
proscribes the rights of those involved in a court proceeding; these apply to both the accused and 
the accuser, the plaintiff, and the defendant.60 Unfortunately, these rules that are designed to give 
due process to all involved in the judicial process often slow down the pace of adjudication and 
create an inflexible and expensive system for dispute resolution.61 The value of arbitration is that 
it is not necessarily fettered by any of the rules of procedure which constrain courts.62 Arbitration 
is a uniquely flexible process because the terms of the parties’ contract determine the process and 
scope of the arbitration. By the same token, arbitration’s very value as a flexible system prevents 
it from providing an adequate resolution system in some contexts. For example, it can be 
inadequate where both parties did not have equal bargaining power when creating the terms- as in 
mandatory arbitration under an employment contract -because the use of arbitration without 
oversight can deprive weaker parties of access to the benefits of the judicial system.63 Employers 
 
58 Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a model, 128 Yale L.J. F. 121, 
134-135 (2018) (stating that employers benefit from the privacy of arbitration and arbitration settlements and are 
often unlikely to remove high level employees accused of harassment unless there is public pressure to do so). 
 
59 See Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, et. al. “#MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly 
Half Their Replacements are Women.” The New York Times, (October 29, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html (outlining 201 different cases of 
#MeToo sexual harassment victims coming forward). 
 
60 Due process, both procedural and substantive, is an essential consideration in a variety of legal challenges brought 
to the Supreme Court. See e.g. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) for a discussion of due process in the civil 
context; See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) for a discussion of fundamental rights 
implicated in the Due Process Clause; and see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, (2003) for a discussion of due 
process in a criminal context.  
 
61 See Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitration and The U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory Reform 5 J. Disp. Resol. 
231, 238 (1990) (describing the failure of American courts to resolve disputes as a result of procedural processes 
designed to protect legal rights).  
 
62 Carbonneau, supra note 5 at 2 (stating that arbitration is valuable to business people because it provides an 
effective and efficient and reasonably fair form of justice).  
 
63 See Carbonneau, supra note 59 (“Advancing arbitral relief as the exclusive remedial standard in the area of 
commercial regulation not only divest society of basic governance over such matters, but it could also result in the 
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gain an advantage in arbitration proceedings by deciding rules when employees unknowingly 
agree to terms in adhesive contracts.64 Unlike in the courts, where everyone is held to the same 
terms or the established law, the flexibility of arbitration allows arbitrators to render justice 
differently in different situations. Arbitrators do not have to consider the law, unless the contract 
says so, or can additionally consider industrial factors when making their decisions.65 Arbitrators 
under a collective bargaining agreement, for example, first decide culpability and then a remedy 
appropriate for the action while courts are asked to strictly determine guilt or non-guilt.66 
 However, it is true that arbitrators can use a variety of methods to try and ensure fairness in 
arbitral proceedings.67 Therefore, arguments are made that the employer’s superior bargaining 
power does not necessarily decrease the availability of justice to the employee since after all, 
standards and procedures exist to protect the interest of parties under adhesive arbitration 
agreements.68 Ultimately, the flexibility of arbitration procedures is exactly what makes arbitration 
problematic as a way to adjudicate claims of sexual harassment.  
Arbitration’s flexibility ideally allows parties who agree to arbitration to resolve their disputes 
in a manner that they choose.  However, because employees can agree to arbitration in situations 
where they had little or no understanding of the consequences that can stem from agreeing to 
arbitrate, employees are effectively deprived of access to the courts for redress of their claims.69 
The current decisional law, though, supports enforcing these agreements, necessitating functional 
legislation to give employees a meaningful choice as to whether to arbitrate or go to a court of law 
for resolution of these disputes.70  
 
loss of the adjudicatory safeguards that proceed from a procedural process built upon public scrutiny, fairness, and a 
basic right of appeal- one which entrusts socially divisive issues to an impartial and principled judiciary.”)   
 
64 See Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 
Widener L. Rev. 101, 103 (2010) (describing studies finding that arbitration favors sophisticated corporate players 
and can be tilted against individuals).  
 
65 Mollie H. Bowers, E. Patrick McDermott, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Decide” 48 
Clev. St. L. Rev. 439, 440 (“Regardless of whether an arbitrator elects to apply external law, he considers broader 
concepts of industrial jurisprudence in determining what the remedy shall be. This seems to create a chasm between 
arbitral treatment of sexual harassment allegations and that of Federal courts under Title VII.”)  
 
66 Id. (stating that an arbitrator’s mandate is to not to consider whether the complainant’s legal rights are violated 
(like a court would) but rather whether, in the particular case, the employer proved the conduct and the remedy was 
sufficient for that conduct. This implies arbitrators do not consider outside law when rendering their decisions, at 
least in the same manner as courts). 
 
67 See Hickox, supra note 62 at 108 (describing programs employers can use to create more fair arbitral proceedings 
when they seek to compel arbitration; for example, employers can ensure the employee was a participant in 
meaningful communications about the arbitration clause in their employment agreement).  
 
68  See e.g. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for 
Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers L.J. 399 (2000).  
 
69 See e.g.  Hickox, supra note 62, at 108 (describing case law as accepting the mere presentation of the arbitral 
clause in an employee handbook as sufficient to demonstrate an employee’s consent).  
 
70 Carbonneau, supra note 59 (“the tenor of the current decisional law makes it unlikely that the Court will fashion 
for itself and other federal courts an authority sufficient to make the necessary corrections… an intelligent 





IV. THE ENDING FORCED ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT   
 
The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act would serve as an attempt to remedy 
arbitration’s failure to give victims of sexual harassment sufficient due process by preventing 
employers from forcing employees who bring claims of sexual harassment into arbitration 
proceedings. Under the Act, claims that are considered “sex disputes” would be excluded from 
arbitrability.71 The Act defines “sex disputes” as “any dispute between an employee and employer 
which would form the basis of a claim based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”72 The 
Act would amend the FAA to render any pre-dispute arbitration clauses which purport to govern 
these areas unenforceable as a matter of federal law.73 The Act also provides that any questions as 
to its applicability should be referred to the courts rather than an arbitrator.74 Given the Supreme 
Court’s stance on the strength of the FAA and its supremacy in the field of arbitration, this bill 
would be an effective way to change the nearly limitless bounds of arbitrability. In doing so, it 
would give those bringing sexual harassment claims fair access to due process, and provide 
meaningful reform as one way to destabilize the culture of silence surrounding sexual harassment 
that allows those who commit these actions to remain in power. A caveat to the Act’s protections 
can be found in § 402(b)(2), which provides that nothing in the chapter applies to contacts between 
an employer and a labor organization,75 except that no arbitration agreement waives the 
employees’ right to judicial enforcement of statutory claims.76 Although the legislative history 
provides no guidance as to why the drafters chose to exempt agreements with labor unions, the 
probable reason is that these organizations have developed their own alternative dispute resolution 
processes.77 Similarly, the bargaining power between unions and employers is theoretically more 
balanced, eliminating some of the fundamental concerns that the Ending Forced Arbitration of 
Sexual Harassment Act seeks to eliminate for individual employees.  
 
 
71 See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017) (“Except as 
provided in subsection (b)(2), and notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination dispute.”) 
 




74 See id., §402(b)(1) (“The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and 
enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator, 
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in 
conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement.”) 
 
75 Id., §402(b)(2) . 
 
76 Id., (“…except that no such arbitration provision shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek 
judicial enforcement of a right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, 
or a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising therefrom.") 
 
77 See id. at legislative history; and see Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the 
Past Quarter Century, 25 ABA Journal Lab. & Emp. Law 411 (2010) (for a thorough discussion of the evolution of 




Unfortunately, Congress has shown very little willingness to actually pass this essential 
legislation. For example, Congress has rejected other arbitration reform legislation, such as the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, which would prevent the inclusion of pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
in contracts.78 Congress has not acted despite continuing public discourse about the problems 
surrounding sexual harassment and abuse and the silence that their victims are encouraged to 
maintain.79 As the MeToo movement approaches its one year anniversary of existence, some 
powerful figures such as Gretchen Carlson, who came forward about the sexual harassment she 
endured under Roger Ailes for years, have called for the passage of the Act.80 Similarly, some 
corporations, such as Microsoft, have acted on their own to remove adhesive arbitration clauses 
from their employment contracts.81 Congress has not acted despite powerful market statements 
like these. While federal legislation is the best way to achieve meaningful reform, it is not the only 
solution. 
 
V. STATES SHOULD FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF AND LEARN LESSONS FROM STATES THAT 
HAVE ALREADY ENACTED REFORM MEASURES  
 
The states should act to protect their citizens in light of Congress’s unwillingness to pass 
meaningful reform legislation. States should act to rectify the due process concerns expressed by 
the State Attorneys General when they argued for the passage of the Ending Forced Arbitration of 
Sexual Harassment Act82 because arbitration deprives claimants of due process. The largest 
difficulty for state legislators in this area is the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence about arbitration; 
the Supreme Court has held a multitude of times that the FAA preempts state law.83 Thus, state 
legislators must enact legislation that does not directly contradict the FAA in order to withstand 
judicial scrutiny.  
 
78 See Morgan Stanley, Sixth Time’s the Charm: Rethinking the Arbitration Fairness Act to Achieve Practical 
Reform, 10 Arb. L. Rev. 199 (2019) (for a discussion of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act and Congressional 
reluctance to pass arbitration reform). 
 
79 See e.g. Ellen Bravo, Are we at a tipping point on sexual misconduct?, Quartz at Work, (Oct. 2, 2018) (discussing 
recent current events involving sexual misconduct) https://qz.com/work/1410390/are-we-at-a-tipping-point-on-
sexual-misconduct/.  
 
80 See e.g. Gretchen Carlson, To Succeed, MeToo Must Target America’s Laws, not just a few powerful men, 
azcentral, USAtoday, (Sep. 25, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/voices/2018/09/25/me-too-
anniversary-women-sexual-harassment-gretchen-carlson-column/1381126002/. 
81 See Nick Wingfield and Jessica Silver-Green, Microsoft Moves to End Secrecy in Sexual Harassment Claims, The 
New York Times, (Dec. 19, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/technology/microsoft-sexual-harassment-
arbitration.html (“Microsoft, one of the world’s biggest software makers, said on Tuesday that it had eliminated 
forced arbitration agreements with employees who make sexual harassment claims and was also supporting a 
proposed federal law that would widely ban such agreements.”) 
82 See Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 6 (“ending mandatory arbitration of sexual 
harassment claims would help put a stop to the culture of silence that protects perpetrators at the cost of their 
victims.”)  
 





Several states, including New York and Vermont, have already taken action in this area and 
can be used as examples of possible types of legislation that would help provide due process to 
employees bringing sexual harassment claims.84 New York has taken radical action and simply 
made pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims illegal and unenforceable.85 It 
appears that New York’s legislators attempted to circumvent federal preemption by including the 
language “except where inconsistent with federal law,” into the provision,86 but the New York 
approach still has its limitations as a reform measure. New York’s legislation attempts to achieve 
what Congress has not, preventing the inclusion of “mandatory arbitration” of “sexual 
harassment”87 clauses in employment contracts but similarly retains an exception for collective 
bargaining agreements.88 However, if New York’s law is challenged in federal court, it is unlikely 
that even the exclusion of inconsistent federal law provision would be sufficient to prevent the 
Court from enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements,89 even if the parties specifically invoke 
New York law.90 
Vermont’s legislators took a slightly more nuanced approach when they enacted legislation in 
May of 2018 that would not invalidate agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims per se, (in 
fact, the legislation does not even refer to arbitration by name) but amend Vermont’s employment 
regulations to set limitations on what employers could ask employees to agree to in their 
employment contracts related to sexual harassment claims in general.91 The legislation prohibits 
employers from requiring any employee to sign agreements which would prevent the employee’s 
participation in an investigation relating to or disclosure of sexual harassment,92 and requires that 
“an agreement to settle a claim of sexual harassment” must expressly state that it does not restrict 
the employee’s rights to pursue relief in any other forum.93 Vermont’s approach is more functional 
 
84  Porter Wells, States Take Up #MeToo Mantle in Year After Weinstein, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 3, 2018) 
https://www.bna.com/states-metoo-mantle-n73014482949/ (thirty-two states introduced MeToo related legislation, 
but only four, Maryland, New York, Vermont, and Washington, have enacted legislation to limit mandatory 
arbitration specifically).  
 
85  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 75 §7515 (2018).  
 
86  Id., at §7515(b)(i).  
 
87  Id. at §7515(a), §7514(b). 
 
88  Id., §7515(c) (“where there is a conflict between any collective bargaining agreement and this section, such 
agreement shall be controlling.”) 
 
 
90  But see Volt Info. Scis. V. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“… it does not follow that the FAA prevents 
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the act itself.”)  
 
91  21 Vt. Stat. Ann. §495h (2018) amended by Vt. H.B. 707 (May 28, 2018). 
 
92 See id. at §(G)(1)(A). 
 
93 Id. at §G(1)(B) (prohibiting employers from requiring employees to sign agreements which (except as otherwise 
permitted by state and federal law) waive procedural rights and remedies available to the employee making the 
claim) also see Id. at §H (listing various forums and actions employees may not be prevented by agreement from 





than New York’s, which expressly bans a type of arbitration agreement, but could still be 
invalidated by the Court if challenged along the same general reasoning the court employed in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating.94 However, overall Vermont has taken an approach that provides 




While no state has passed perfect legislation to address mandatory arbitration’s shortcomings 
as the adjudicatory method for employment sexual harassment claims, the growing trend of states 
acting to provide increased protections for these employees is a sign that state governments, at 
least, understand the importance of legislation to make meaningful reform in the employment 
arbitration arena. Although each state reform measure must confront the Supreme Court’s 
sweeping jurisprudence regarding the emphatic public policy favoring arbitration, the efforts made 
in states like New York, and Vermont to create laws that will provide protection as well as honor 
the judicial policy should serve as examples that other states can follow. States should continue to 
experiment with policies that will address the concerns raised by the public and their own 
Attorneys General. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the pressures of the MeToo Movement 
and the efforts of the states to regulate arbitration may, (and should) serve as the political impetus 
needed to persuade Congress to pass the Act, which would provide reform, address due process 
concerns, and is the most likely avenue for arbitration reform that would withstand judicial 
scrutiny.  
 
94 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that Congress intended to foreclose the ability of state 
legislators to create laws that directly opposed the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA).   
